The Law of Confessions - The Voluntariness Doctrine by Lederer, Fredric I.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1976
The Law of Confessions - The Voluntariness
Doctrine
Fredric I. Lederer
William & Mary Law School, filede@wm.edu
Copyright c 1976 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Lederer, Fredric I., "The Law of Confessions - The Voluntariness Doctrine" (1976). Faculty Publications. 1945.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1945
THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS-
THE VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE*
Captain Fredric I. Lederer"
I. INTRODUCTION
Few areas of criminal procedure have proven as complex as
the law of confessions. Basic issues of self-incrimination and
voluntariness have been increasingly complicated by Article
31 warnings' and the Miranda-Tempia rights to counsel.3
Technically speaking, compliance with the Article 31 -Miranda-
Tempia rights warnings is an issue distinct from the voluntari-
ness of the associated statement. However, in practice the two
have become so interrelated as to be virtually identical. This is
particularly true in the military, for the Manual for Courts-
Martial4 has declared that "Obtaining [a] statement in viola-
tion of Article 31(b) or other warning requirements" is an ex-
ample of "coercion, unlawful influence, and unlawful induce-
ment. ' 5 In day-to-day practice, most prosecutors laying a
*0 1976 by Fredric I. Lederer; all rights reserved. Reproduction of any kind
without the express permission of the author is prohibited. This article is a modification
of Chapter Twenty-four of P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN,. E. IMWINKELRIED & F.
LEDERER, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE to be published by the West Publishing Co. in 1977.
** Captain, JAGC, U.S. Army. Instructor. Criminal Law Division, The Judge
Advocate General's School, U.S. Army; Lecturer-in-law, University of Virginia School
of Law. B.S., 1968, Polytechnic Institute of New York; J.D., 1971, Columbia University
School of Law; LL.M., 1976, University of Virginia School of Law. Member of the
Bars of New York, the United States Court of Military Appeals and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
IThe UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 1-140, 10 U.S.C. §§ 800-940
(1970) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ] provides the statutory framework for the military
criminal law system. Article 31 of that Code prohibits compulsory self-incrimination.
and requires any person subject to the Code to inform any individual suspected of an
offense of certain rights before interrogating or requesting a statement of such indi-
vidual. UCMJ art. 31(a) & rb).
2 Miranda v. Ari7ona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); United States v. Tempia, 16
U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). In United States v. Tempia the United States
Court of Military Appeals applied Miranda to military practice.
3 See generally Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services. 72 MIL. L
REv. 1(1976).
4 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.), para.
140a(2) [hereinafter cited as MCM, 1969]. The Manual, promulgated by executive
order, prescribes the procedures before courts-martial in conformity with the Uniform
Code.
MCM, 1969. para. 140a(2). This section was added as an Interpretation ot
Miranda. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No 27-2. ANALNSIS OF COTENTS MAN-
UAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATfS 1969 at 27-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as DA PAsi 27-2]. While this conclusion was not unreasonable when announced, it is
clear that subsequent civilian cases have distinguished between confessions obtained
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foundation for admission of an accused's statement under-
standably concentrate on the rights warnings and usually give
little more than passing attention to common law or due process
considerations of voluntariness. While this may normally be
adequate, it can be suggested that we are not generally pre-
pared to argue voluntariness issues. 6 This is likely to become
particularly important in the near future as the Supreme Court
appears embarked on a course designed to strictly limit
Miranda.7 While limitation or even elimination of this prec-
edent will leave Article 31 intact, it is probable that the in-
creased attention paid to voluntariness by civilian courts will
cause a resurgence of military interest in the doctrine. Accord-
ingly, it appears appropriate to review the voluntariness doc-
trine as it currently exists.
II. DEFINITIONS
A confession is a statement by an individual admitting all of
the elements of a crime. Historically a confession took place
before the court and was the equivalent of a conviction.8 Dis-
tinct from a confession, an admission is a statement admitting
facts relevant to proof of a crime but less than a confession. In
terms of admissibility there is generally 9 no difference be-
tween an admission and a confession. 10
in violation of Miranda and confessions found to be involuntary on non-Miranda
grounds. Consequences may differ as in the case of the effect of erroneous admission
of a "bad" statement. See Section IX infra.
6 In reality, the rights warnings serve as a valuable prosecutorial tool. If a valid
waiver can be shown in court there appears to be an implicit assumption that the
statement was voluntary in the common law sense. Without the warnings the prosecu-
tion would have to devote a much greater amount of time to proving voluntariness.
7See, e.g.. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971 ). But see Doyle v. Ohio, 423 U.S. 823 (1976).
8 See, e.g., W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, OF
PUtBIC WRONGS 421 (Beacon Press ed. 1962); 3 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE, § 818 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
I In the past some jurisdictions distinguished between admissions and confessions
for such matters as the effect of error in their admission at trial (admissions being
more easily excused than confessions). While some differences may continue to exist
in the states, see, e.g., State v. Shaw, 284 N.C. 366, 200 S.E.2d 585 (1973); People v.
Koch, 304 N.E.2d 482 (II1. App. 1973), there appears to be no difference in their treat-
ment under the Constitution. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966). In
this article reference to either admissions or confessions will include both possibilities
unless otherwise indicated.
10 Exculpatory statements are those that deny wrongdoing. They were treated dif-
ferently from admissions or confessions at common law. However, because of their
use for impeachment, constitutional doctrine treats them as admissions. Miranda v.
Ari7ona, 384 U.S. 436,476-77 (1966)
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A judicial confession is simply a confession made in court,
usually by an accused who has taken the stand. A judicial con-
fession frequently takes place when an accused admits com-
mission of one offense while denying responsibility for another,
more serious offense. All other confessions are technically
extrajudicial ones but are usually referred to merely as con-
fessions.
Adoptive admissions are those admissions, by speech or
conduct, which although made by another are adopted by a
witness or an accused."
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
CONFESSIONS
To successfully offer a confession into evidence, a counsel
must comply with the hearsay rule, the voluntariness doctrine
and the corroboration requirement. Admissions and confessions
when made by a party to the trial are of course exceptions to
the hearsay rule.12 The voluntariness doctrine requires that
admissions and confessions be shown to have been made
voluntarily. The doctrine is designed to ensure the reliability
of evidence and to protect against unfairness. The corrobora-
tion requirement demands that before a confession can result
in a conviction, enough other evidence must be shown to sub-
stantiate the commission of an offense or to establish the
"Also known as tacit admissions, admission by silence has proven troublesome
because of the Miranda warning that a suspect has the right to remain silent. Of what
probative value is the silence of a suspect regardless of the circumstances if he has
just been warned of his right to say nothing? The Supreme Court has finally held that
admissions by silence after Miranda warnings are inadmissible, Doyle v. Ohio, 423 U.S,
823 (1976). See generally Comment, Adoptive Admissions, Arrest. and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: A Suggested Constitutional Imperative. 31 U. CiIu. L
REV. 556 (1964); Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of
Post-Arrest Silence. 123 U. PA. L. REV. 940 (1975).
12The underlying rationale for the recognition of the admission and confession
exception to the hearsay rule is unclear. It would seem to be based in part on the need
for the evidence, as the declarant will be uncompellable due to the privilege against
self-incrimination; and partially on the same reasoning that underlies the rule which
renders declarations against interest admissible. However, there are a number of types
of admissions, including exculpatory ones, which prove difficult to explain under
either rationale, and it may be that the rule should be considered as not falling within
any one theory. See State v. Kennedy, 135 N.J. Super. 513. 343 A.2d 783 (1975). The
requirement that the statement come from a party to the trial can be highly trouble-
some both in theory and practice. For those jurisdictions which lack the declaration
against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, it can result in the exclusion of
a confession made byan individual not on trial.
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reliability of the confession.' 3 In addition to the rules discussed
above, statements offered should be offered in their entirety
(or the opposition may complete the statement) 4 and where
applicable, compliance with presentation rules 15  or rights
warnings requirements must be shown.' 6
From the 17th Century, Anglo-American law has been con-
cerned that confession evidence be "voluntary" in the sense
that it is not obtained by coercive measures. The reasoning
behind this concern has been twofold: that involuntary state-
ments are prone to be unreliable, and that coercion of state-
ments is fundamentally unfair. While the development of the
rule will be traced in the next section, brief consideration of
the reliability of confession evidence seems appropriate, as it
may be the most contradictory form of evidence available in a
criminal trial. On the one hand, its effect is so sweeping and
damning that for all practical purposes it is conclusive of the
issue of guilt. On the other, while the law recognizes that con-
fession evidence is in one sense "preferred" evidence, it also
recognizes that confessions are highly likely to be unreliable
and accordingly are to be carefully controlled. While it is ap-
parent that under certain circumstances most persons would
confess to almost anything, it is difficult to gauge the extent to
which ihterrogation methods that do not utilize torture do in
fact result in unreliable admissions. There is a surprising
paucity of literature, legal or psychological, on why confessions
result.' 7 However, the material that does exist makes it abun-
dantly clear that despite the absence of the "third degree,"
3 The majority rule requires independent evidence to establish the commission
of an offense (the corpus delicti rule) and the minority rule requires only that other
evidence be admitted to show the reliability of the confession. See Section VIII.E. infra.
14 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 542 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1975); MCM, 1969, para. I
140a(6).
'5 E.g., that the accused was brought before a magistrate within the required
time period, a rule designed to ensure that an accused will be informed of his rights
and not subjected to police questioning for too long a time before judicial intervention
takes place. The military lacks such a rule at present. See, e.g., Burns v. Harris, 340
F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 960 (1965).
16 See generally Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 MIL. L. REv.
1 (1976).
17 See, e.g., Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv.
L. Rev. 42 (1968); Griffith & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation
of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967); Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic
Society 28 IND. L.J. 133 (1953); Horowitz, Psychology of Confession. 47 J. CRIM. L.
C. & P.S. 197 (1956); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in
Our Nation's Capital. he Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Micn. L. REv. 1347
(1968); Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J. Put.
L. 25 (1965); Summers, Science Can Get the Confession, 8 FORD. L. Rev. 334 (1939);




good police techniques 8 can obtain admissions from most
people. What is particularly disturbing is that even accepted
police techniques can result in false admissions.
One motive for confessing is clearly to attempt to avoid
possible violence or to gain favors. Beyond this obvious reason
are a number of others which include:
1) Desire to mitigate possible future punishment of self
or others;19
2) Desire to clear conscience of known offense;
3) Desire for punishment;
4) Desire for public attention (e.g. notoriety);
5) Desire for recognition of personal status;20
6) Desire for approval by authority (e.g. police); or
7) Feelings of general guilt because of arrest. 2'
For many people the comparative isolation, fear, and embar-
rassment that are likely to accompany arrest and interrogation
may well trigger, due to the factors listed above, a desire to
admit details of real or imaginary offenses. Indeed one com-
mentator has pointed out that the Miranda rights warnings may
have the effect of encouraging confessions rather than prevent-
ing them, because they present the interrogator as a fair, im-
partial officer and yet (unless the suspect refuses to talk at all)
do nothing to affect the ability of the underlying situation to
suggest that a confession is required.22 The number of false
confessions is unknown but their existence is well docu-
28 IND. L.J. 374 (1953); Note, Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda. 76
YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). See also F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL IN-ERROGATIONS AND
CON ESSIONS (2d ed. 1967); T. RINK, COMPULSION TO CO NFEss 179-356 (1972 reprint).
18 See, e.g., F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS
(2d ed. 1967). Many of the techniques suggested by Professors Inbau and Reed in
their 1962 edition have been said to have been used by Russian and Chinese interro-
gators. Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J. Pus. L.
25, 37, 40-41 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Sterling]. While this is not to suggest that
they are improper, it may suggest their efficiency.
"9 Despite the usual inference, this factor applies to the innocent as well as to the
guilty. When the future looks frightening, a suspect may well prefer to confess in return
for a small sentence rather than chancing a majorpenalty.
2 This factor is distinguished fron the others as it may apply when an individual
of some social standing suddenly reacts to the total loss of that status and desires the
interrogators to treat him with some of his former respect. See Driver, Confessions
and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L REv. 42, 58-59 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Driver].
21 These feelings of guilt need not be related to any offense and may stem simply
from the belief of the individual that his arrest means that he must have done some-
thing. See, e.g., Sterling, supra note 18, at 36.
22 See Driver, supra note 20, at 59-61.
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mented. 23 Whether their number is "sufficiently" substantial
to cast general doubt on confession evidence is unknown. 24 The
conclusion that can be drawn, however, is that confession evi-
dence per se is at least partially suspect. A necessary result of
this conclusion is that spontaneous confessions, made without
any police questioning, may be no more reliable than confes-
sions gained after hours or days of interrogation, for many of
the factors will operate in the absence of even implicit coercion.
However, to eliminate confessions would be to substantially
increase police work. The ultimate balance is yet to be deter-
mined.
IV. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE
Professor Wigmore found four stages in the English develop-
ment of the law of confessions: 25 total acceptance of confession
evidence until approximately 1750; limited exclusion of in-
voluntary confessions from approximately 1750 to 1800; hyper-
sensitivity to confessions resulting in almost wholesale exclu-
sion;26 and the current rule characterized in the United States
by constitutional underpinnings. Differing slightly from
Wigmore, Professor Levy finds that the voluntariness rule was
at least partially recognized by 172627 and suggests that the pri-
23 See, e.g., 3 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at 304 n. 1.
24 One may ask how many innocent men society would tolerate to be convicted
as a consequence of unreliable confessions. It is particularly interesting to note that
under Jewish Rabbinic law all confessions were inadmissible. See, e.g.. G. HOROWiTZ,
THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW § 338 (1973). It would be an interesting experiment if
a jurisdiction chose either to ban confession evidence entirely or to accept only de-
rivative evidence.
25 3 WIGMOR, supra note 8, at § 817.
26 Id. at §§ 820 & 820a. Wigmore postulates the following explanations for the
English approach during the early 1800's: the character of suspect (lower social class
with a subordination to authority); the absence of a right to appeal and the resulting
difficulty of obtaining a rule of general application; the inability of the accused to take
the stand in his own behalf. It is also probable that the large number of offenses
carrying the death penalty in the first quarter-century may have motivated exclusion.
27 Lord Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, in his Law of Evidence, written before 1726
though not published until thirty years later, stated that though the best evidence of
guilt was a confession, "this Confession must be voluntary and without Compulsion;
for our Law . . .will not force any Man to accuse himself; and in this we do certainly
follow the Law of Nature, which commands every Man to endeavor his own Preserva-
tion; and therefore Pain and Force may compel Men to confess what is not the truth
of Facts, and consequently such extorted Confessions are not to be depended on."
Reprinted in L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 327 (1968).
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mary justification for it was to prevent receipt of unreliable
evidence. Although separate and distinct from the right against
self-incrimination, the voluntariness doctrine plainly had its
origins in the same complex of values and social conflicts that
gave rise to the right. Because much of the objection to self-
incrimination was based on opposition to torture-derived con-
fessions, the groundwork was laid for exclusion of coerced
confessions. Except during the period when exclusion of con-
fession evidence may have served other purposes (such as
mitigating overly severe sentences), the English voluntariness
rule appears to have been based primarily on reliability
grounds, although questions of fairness no doubt were also
relevant. Although the right against self-incrimination per se
had no remedy (for it only allowed an individual to remain
silent, and once testimony was given the right was waived), the
voluntariness doctrine created a remedy; for if an individual
was compelled to confess, his statement could be excluded thus
in effect attaching an exclusionary sanction to violations of the
right against self-incrimination. This should not be miscon-
strued, for all coerced confessions were not inadmissible. Par-
ticularly during the 1700's in England, the question was one of
apparent truthfulness rather than breach of a privilege.
As in the case of the right against self-incrimination, the
voluntariness doctrine was transplanted to the American
colonies. Formal recognition took place in Pennsylvania by
179228 at latest, for example. The common law voluntariness
doctrine was the rule in the United States during most of the
19th Century, although presumably it did not carry with it the
anti-confession bias common in England during the early
1800's. Despite the existence of the fifth amendment and later
the fourteenth amendment (enacted in 1868), the Supreme
Court failed to make use of constitutional rationales2 9 until
1897 when the Court decided Bram v. United States.30 In
Bram, a murder case, the Court found the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination required reversal of the convic-
tion due to the receipt in evidence of an involuntary confession.
Brain was the high point of the application of the privilege
2"Commonwealth v. Dillon, 4 Dallas 116 (1792). cited in 0. SThEuu.s. TIlE
SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 23 (1973).
29The Court did apply the common law voluntariness test to federal cases. See
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621-25 (1896); Sparf v. United States. 156 U.S.
51,53-56(1895); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574,584-87(1884).
- 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Interestingly, the Court in Brain considered and rejected
the argument that police interrogation was per se coercive. Id. at 566-58.
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against self-incrimination to confessions and the Court retreat-
ed from its holding in that case.3' Professor Otis Stephens32
states that in respect to its review of federal confession cases,
the Supreme Court, while emphasizing the reliability test for
coerced statements, began to swing towards concern about
fair trial generally.33 In 1936, the Court in the state case of
Brown v. Mississipp 3 4  held that admission of a coerced
confession into evidence violated the fourteenth amendment's
requirement of due process. The facts in Brown cried out for
reversal. A white Mississippi farmer had been murdered. In
order to obtain a confession from one black "suspect," a deputy
sheriff accompanied by a mob hanged him twice from a tree.
Having refused to confess, he was released, rearrested a day or
so later, and beaten. He then signed the desired confession. The
two other black suspects, including Brown, were jailed and
beaten until they too confessed as their captors desired. It is
clear that in reversing the conviction the Supreme Court was
motivated by the specific facts and the obvious injustice of the
case. However, it is also likely that the Court's extension of
due process standards to confessions was motivated by the
Wickersham Report,35 which had confirmed the use of the
"third degree" (physical violence) and psychological coercion
31 This may have been due to the Court's holding in Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination was inapplicable to the states. But see the Court's
admission that the voluntariness doctrine is grounded in the same policies giving rise
to the privilege against self-incrimination. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740
(1966).
320. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 26 (1973).
Professor Stephens' work is a good introduction to the development of the law of
confessions in the United States for those lacking a substantial background in the
subject. For a review of the development of the doctrine beginning with Bram, see
Bader, Coerced Confessions and the Due Process Clause, 14 BKLYN. L. REv. 51 (1948);
Gangi, A Critical View of the Modem Confession Rule: Some Observations on Key
Confession Cases, 28 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1974); Inbau, The Confession Dilemma In the
United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948); Kamisar, What Is an "In-
voluntary" Confession: Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogations
and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1963).
31 See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924) (one week's
incommunicado detention without arrest while ill with constant questioning; held,
compulsion automatically required reversal).
- 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Brown held that a state conviction resting solely on a
coerced confession required reversal. Later cases indicated that reversal was merited
in almost all cases involving coerced confessions (the automatic reversal rule). See
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
35 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [THE WICKERSHAM REPORT].
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to obtain confessions across the country-particularly from the
poor and disadvantaged. The Court's subsequent cases36
tended to manifest a strong element of redress for racial dis-
crimination as many poor blacks were the targets of brutal
beatings designed to coerce confessions.
While the Court has consistently reaffirmed the voluntariness
requirement of Brown v. Mississippi, 37 its actual application
of the voluntariness doctrine has varied greatly. After Brown,
the Court made use of its supervisory powers to require that
federal defendants be promptly brought before magistrates,
thus strictly limiting the time available for police interroga-
tion. 38 In the state arena, the Court took an active role in
preventing coerced confessions 39 and then turned temporarily
to considering primarily the "trustworthiness" 40 of the coerced
confession-a standard that emphasized reliability. Beginning
in the mid-1950's the Court returned to its earlier philosophy
and scrutinized confessions not so much from the perspective
of reliability but more from the standpoint of the fairness of the
procedure involved.41 Ultimately the Court decided Miranda v.
Arizona42 which held that the innate coercion of custodial
interrogation required that suspects be given rights warnings,
including the right to counsel, to dispel the coercive effect. At
present, the test used throughout the United States emphasizes
36 See, e.g.. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Vernon v. Alabama. 313 U.S.
547 (1941); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940);
Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)
(lead case).
37 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
38 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332(1942).
* In Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), an exception and an unusually
gruesome murder case, the Court upheld a coerced confession on the grounds that
the defendant's will had not been overborne. The Court did state, however, that the
aim of the due process requirement was "to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use
of evidence€ whether true or false." 314 U.S. at 236. The cynical reader must infer that
had it not been for the nature of the crime involved, the case would have been reversed.
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), the Supreme Court recognized that
psychological coercion, as well as physical brutality, could make a statement invol-
untary. Ashcraft also introduced the shortlived test of -inherent coercion," a test which
looked to the nature of the police misconduct. The test, superseded by the -fair
trial" test, eventually became a part of the contemporary voluntariness doctrine under
a new name.
4 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), overruled, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368(1964).
41 See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S.
191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
42 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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fairness rather than reliability and asks if the statement was
the product of a free and unrestrained choice.43
V. THE VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE TODAY
Although the voluntariness doctrine has been greatly af-
fected by the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,44
it retains vitality for determining the admissibility of confes-
sions.4 5 Determining the exact nature of the doctrine is difficult,
however, in view of the ambiguity inherent in the term "vol-
untary." 46 Every individual jurisdiction in the United States
has its own statutorily47 or judicially derived definition of "vol-
untary." Generally the states will suppress confessions that are
the product of coercion, threats, or improper inducements just
as they would be suppressed under the common law. The state
provisions may differ, however, in respect to what constitutes
improper inducements, what effect is to be given to the sus-
pect's age, mentality and similar attributes, and the effect to be
given to other relevant factors. Regardless of the individual
state test, the federal constitutional test is paramount.48 Under
43 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961); United States v. Colbert, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 6 C.M.R.
3 (1952). Seealso MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2).
- 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45 While the term voluntariness is still used, generally the voluntariness of a con-
fession means that the rights warnings required by Miranda were properly given to the
accused and that visible coercion was lacking. See, e.g., MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2).
However, the rights warnings are merely one component of voluntariness. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1975). The English continue
to use a strict common law standard. See C. HAMPTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE 436-38 (London 1973).
46 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,223-27 (1973),
41 See, e.g., Georgia: "To make a confession admissible, it must have been made
voluntarily, without being induced by another, by the slighteqt hope of benefit or
remotest fear of injury." GA. CODE ANN. § 38-411 (1974) and "The fact that a confes-
sion shall have been made under a spiritual exhortation, or a promise of secrecy, or a
promise of collateral benefit, shall not exclude it." Id. § 38412.
New York:
A confession, admission or other statement is 'involuntarily made" by a defendant when it is obtained
from him. (a) By any person by the use or threatened use of physical force upon the defendant or
another person, or by means of any other improper conduct or undue pressre which impaired the
defendant's physical or mental condition to the extent of undermining his ability to make a choice
whether or not to make a statement; or (b) By a public servant engaged in 6%t enforcement activity
or by a person then acting under his direction or in cooperation with him: (i) by means of any promise
or statement of fact, which promise or statement creates a substantial risk that the defendant might
falsely incriminate himself. or (ii) in violation of such rights as the defendait may derive from the
constitution ofthis state or of the United States.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 60.45.2 (McKinney 1971). See generally 3 WIOMORE, supra
note 8, at § 831 n.2. Congress attempted to adopt the voluntariness doctrine (and
avoid Miranda) in 18 U.S.C. §3501 (1970).





the due process clause, a court must determine whether a
confession was "the product of an essentially free and unre-
strained choice" by its maker.49 If the individual's will was
"overborne" by the interrogation, the resulting 0 confession
will be involuntary and inadmissible. In determining the
voluntariness of a statement, the trial court must look to "the
totality of the circumstances" surrounding it. The primary
purpose of the due process test is to ensure fairness; the truth
or falsity of the resulting confession is irrelevant. 51 Of course
the courts have assumed that voluntary statements are likely
to be reliable ones.
While the due process test suggests a case by case approach
that would seek to determine a causal connection between
police52 misconduct and a confession, analysis of the cases
suggests that actually two separate rules are being applied.53
In those cases where the misconduct appears extreme, as in
cases of physical brutality, the courts will frequently find that
the misconduct has rendered the statement involuntary per
se.54 In all other cases the courts will test the facts of the case
to determine if the misconduct actually did overcome the will
of the accused.5 5 It is virtually impossible to set forth criteria,
4 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-26 (1973); Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).
"Voluntary" clearly does not mean that the decision to confess must be made without
any pressure or with full awareness of the actual situation. The pressures inherent in
arrest or questioning, for example, are not enough to render a statement involuntary.
'0 It is possible for an individual to confess to clear his conscience even after
improper pressure. The test in such a ease will be whether the statement was the
product of true remorse and intent, or was in fact the product of the improper pressure
and thus involuntary.
51 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961). See MCM, 1969, para.
140a(2); cf. United States v. Tersiner, 47 C.M.R. 769 (AFCMR 1973) Of course, if a
statement was obtained correctly but is likely to be false, the trial judge should exclude
it.
52 The voluntariness doctrine applies to confessions coerced by anyone. Howevver,
problems relating to improper threats and inducements are likely to pertain only to
public officials because they are typically involved in such instances. See N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 60.45.2 (McKinney 1971). See generallr. 3 \VWIMORE. supra note 8. at
§§ 827-830. But see United States v. Carter, 15 U.S C.M.A. 495, 35 C.M.R. 467 (1965)
(statement elicited in response to threats by heavyweight boxer held admissible on
grounds that it was volunteered in an attempt to exculpate, rather than inculpate).
53See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 317-21 (2d ed. 1972); Gang. .4 Crtical View
of the Modern Confession Rule: Some Observations on Key Confesson Cases. 28 ARK.
L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1974).
"See. e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (15 days' solitary confinement
on a restricted diet while naked); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.. 143 (1944) (thirty-
six hours of constant questioning by relays of interrogators).
55See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 530, 45 C.M.R 304
(1972) (statement made after accused was led to believe that his failure to speak
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other than torture, which will result in automatic exclusion.
The situation is very much like the application of the famous
Rochin56 "shock the conscience" test used in search and seiz-
ure cases. Until the conscience is shocked one is unable to
define the test.
The contemporary voluntariness doctrine consists of the due
process standard complemented by those other rules, state and
federal, which reinforce it. While the common law voluntariness
doctrine was primarily concerned with the reliability of the
statement, the areas addressed by a common law judge were
not substantially different from those reviewed by a modern
court applying constitutional and local rules. Thus the existence
of coercion, threats and inducements in a case remains critically
important. When considering the voluntariness issue using the
totality of the circumstances test, a court must look to numerous
factors. According to Wigmore, 57 among the factors to be con-
sidered are:
The character of the accused (health, age, education, in-
telligence, mental condition, physical condition);
Character of detention, if any (delay in arraignment, warn-
ing of rights, incommunicado conditions, access to lawyer,
relatives and friends);
Manner of interrogation (length of session(s), relays,
number of interrogators, conditions, manner of interro-
gators); and
Force, threats, promises or deceptions.
A. COERCION AND THREATS
Of all the possible forms of misconduct, the one most likely
to result in automatic exclusion of a statement is physical
coercion. Physical brutality, usually termed the "third degree,"
was of course at the heart of the Supreme Court's turn to due
process standards 58 and is assumed not only to violate mini-
mum standards of fairness but also to yield unreliable state-
ments. When physical coercion is involved, it is generally
irrelevant that the party responsible was not a policeman or
would result in trial by Nationalist Chinese court rather than an Air Force court-martial
held voluntary because of trial court's determination that it was not induced by the
threat of foreign trial).
56 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
17 3 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at 352 n. 11.
58 See Sections IV& Vsupra.
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public official.59 Because of the extreme concern that accom-
panies charges of police brutality, a number of states require
in such cases that the government call all material witnesses
who were connected with the alleged confession. 60 When dis-
cussing coercion, any attempt to create separate and distinct
categories is doomed to failure. While beating, hanging and
flogging are clearly forms of illegal coercion, other forms of
mistreatment can also be considered as being identical in effect.
In Stidham v. Swenson,61 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit found that solitary confinement for
eighteen months in subhuman conditions prior to the offense,
and return to those conditions after twenty-five interrogation
sessions without any food or water over a four-day period
constituted coercion and rendered the petitioner's confession
involuntary. Courts have condemned as improper coercion
denial of medical treatment, 62  sustained detention, 63  sus-
tained interrogation,64 handcuffing for lengthy periods, 65 and
brutal detention, 66 to mention only a few possibilities. 67 Other
59 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 60.45.2(1) (McKinney 1971); Common-
wealth v. Mahnke, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2897, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975) (vigilante group);
People v. Haydel, 12 Cal. 3d 190, 524 P.2d 866, 115 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1974); 3 WtGNtORE,
supra note 8, at § 833. Note the wording of UCMJ art. 31: "No person subject to this
chapter"; and MCM, 1969, para. 150b: "A statement obtained from the accused by
compelling him to incriminate himself is inadmissible against the accused regardless
of the person applying the compulsion... ."
60See, e.g., Smith v. State, 256 Ark. 67, 505 S.W.2d 504 (1974); Nabors v. State.
293 So. 2d 336 (Miss. 1974).
61 506 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1974). Stidham, imprisoned for robbery, was convicted
of the murder of a fellow inmate during a prison riot. While the facts as portrayed by
the majority are shocking, the dissent suggests an entirely different view. Stldham is
an example of the difficulties sometimes caused by federal habeas corpus. The actual
case had been affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court thirteen years before the first
federal attack was filed, making rebuttal of Stidham's charges difficult. Stidham had
also charged he was beaten but the court discounted the allegation.
62 Cf. Commonwealth v. Purvis, 485 Pa. 359,326 A.2d 369 (1974).
63 Cf Stidham v. Swenson, 506 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Adalle,
12 U.S.C.M.A. 465, 469, 31 C.M.R. 51, 55 (1961) (The Government may not use its
authority to order a servicemember to different geographical locations "as a coercive
instrument for the purpose of removing him to a location at which he is effectively
isolated and likely to succumb to police pressures."). While the issue may not yet be
fully resolved, it would appear that the fact of an illegal arrest or detention will render
a statement inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471(1963).
6United States v. Houston, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 289, 35 C.M.R1 11 (1965) ("persistent
questioning over a five-day period" in conjunction with other factors sufficient to raise
the issue of voluntariness).
65 See, e.g., People v. Holder, 45 App. Div. 2d 1029, 358 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1974).
6See, e.g., Stidham v. Swenson, 406 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1974); United States
v. O'Such, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 537,37 C.M.R. 157 (1957).
67 See generally 3 WtGNOR, supra note 8, at § 833.
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forms of coercion such as loss of employment 68 may also
render a statement involuntary. Whether specific conditions
other than physical punishment will render a statement invol-
untary must depend upon the facts of each case, although
certain factors are obviously likely to be weighed more heavily
than others.
Coercion can of course also be supplied through threats in-
asmuch as coercion includes the psychological as well as the
physical. 69 Refusal to supply medication;70 threats of vio-
lence,71 of removal of wife or children, 72 of arrest or prosecu-
tion of friends or relatives, 73 of continued detention 74 or of
harsher consequences if a confession is not given, 75 may all
constitute sufficient coercion to render a statement involun-
tary. 76
B. PROMISES AND INDUCEMENTS
Like threats, promises and inducements may well result in
involuntary confessions. Clearly a possibility of benefit may
well result in an overborne will rendering a statement violative
of due process. Under the common law test for voluntariness,
which was mostly concerned with the reliability of the state-
ment, some forms of inducements, such as religious appeals,
were not considered likely to result in false or inaccurate con-
fessions.77 This may no longer be the case in view of the effect
of Miranda v. Arizona.78 In theory, any promise or inducement
should be analyzed under the usual due process test. However,
perhaps as a result of the common law heritage, many states
will almost automatically suppress a confession that took place
after a promise or inducement. Most improper promises tend
to involve representations that the police will not arrest or
6 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,496-500 (1967).
69 Id. at 496-97.
70 See, e.g., Northern v. State, 254 Ark. 549,518 S.W.2d 482(1975).
71 See. e.g., United States v. Fowler, 2 C.M.R. 336, 341 (ABR 1952) (threat of
violence at hands of rape victim's relatives); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAONMENT
PROCEDURE §§ 140.3 & 150.2(6) (1975).
72 See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); People v. Richter, 54 Mich.
App. 660, 221 N.W.2d 429 (1974).
73See. e.g., People v. Helstrom, 50 App. Div. 2d 685, 375 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1975);
People v. Haydel, 12 Cal. 3d 190,524 P.2d 866, 115 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1974).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Jourdan, 51 C.M.R. 351 (AFCMR 1975).
71 See, e.g., Sherman v. State, 532 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (threat by
chief of police that accused would receive the death penalty if he didn't confess).
76 See generally 3 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 833.
- Id.§ 840.
78 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires not only rights warnings but also that the
suspect's decision to speak or not to speak not be affected in any way. Thus an exhor-
tation to confess sin or to simply tell the truth is likely to be viewed as nullifying the
right to remain silent and thus render a statement involuntary.
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prosecute, 79 that leniency as to sentence will result,80 or that
friends or relatives will not be harassed, arrested or prose-
cuted.8' Exhortations to tell the truth are not in violation of the
traditional voluntariness test 82 although they may interfere
with the Miranda rights warnings and invalidate a statement.
Statements resulting from immunity or plea bargains will be
inadmissible against the maker.83 According to Wigmore, for
79 See, e.g., St. Jules v. Beto, 371 F. Supp 470 (S.D. Tex. 1974); United States v.
White, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 34 C.M.R. 426 (1964) (promise of administrative discharge).
M.D.B. v. State, 311 So. 2d 399 (Fla. App. 1975); State v. Raymond, - Minn_
232 N.W.2d 879 (1975). But see People v. Yerdon, 51 App. Div. 2d 875. 380 N.Y.S.2d
141 (1976) (confession held voluntary even though deputy sherriff told defendant first
that he would not arrest him; statement was obtained after proper warnings and was
voluntary). While promises to assist with bail would seem logically similar to promises
not to prosecute or to grant leniency (although in theory the nature of the benefit can
be presumed to be smaller than a failure to prosecute or to receive leniency, and
frequently time spent in jail before trial will be longer than that spent after convic-
tion), the cases seem generally to hold such promises insufficient to render statements
involuntary. See, e.g., People v. York,_. Colo. - 537 P-2d 294 (1975); C. McCon-
MICK, EviDENCE 323 (2d ed. 1972).
w See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 258 Ark.- , 527 S.W.2d 909 (1975) (tmplied
promise of leniency found when prosecutor said that he couldn't promise anything but
that defendant probably wouldn't get more than 21 years in jail if he confessed); People
v. Pineda, 182 Colo. 385, 513 P.2d 452 (1973) (police said that things would go easier
for the accused if he testified). People v. Ruegger, 32 I11. App. 3d 765, 336 N.E-2d 50
(1975) (police conveyed the impression that they would "go to bat" for the accused in
getting him probation). Statements that cooperation would be the best course or that
cooperation would be reported do not appear to necessarily result in ;uppression of
statements. See, e.g., United States v. Pomares, 499 F.2d 1220 (2d Cir 19741; State %.
Mullin, 286 So. 2d 36 (Fla. App. 1973); State v. Smith, 216 Kan. 265, 530 P 2d 1215
(1975); People v. Bulger, 52 App. Div. 2d 682, 382 N.Y S.2d 133 (1976). These cases
seem to assume that the effect of such an inducement is de minimis. Obviously the
result will vary depending upon the exact facts of each case. There are cases that hase
excluded confessions after similar representations.
81 See, e.g., Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d 141 (Fla. App 1975) (police threat to
arrest wife unless defendant confessed made resulting statement involuntary); Witt
v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 212 S.E.2d 293 (1975) (defendant claimed that he
confessed because of his belief that his pregnant wife would be arrested if he didn't;
court found that even if the defendant drew the inference it was unreasonable and the
confession was voluntary). Note that a defendant's belief that confession will assist a
friend or relative, when held without any official representation to that effect will
usually not invalidate a statement. See, e.g., People v. Steger, 16 Cal. 3d 539. 546 P.2d
665. 128 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1976); Witt v. Commonwealth, supra.
82 See, e.g., State v. Rollwage,. Ore. App.-.. 533 P.2d 831 (1975) ("If you
confess you'll feel better" held simply an admonition to tell the truth and proper): 3
WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 832. Cf United States v. Handsome. 21 U.S C.M.A. 330.
45C.M.R. 104(1972).
83See, e.g., Mobley ex rel. Ross v. Meek, 531 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross had
confessed after making a plea bargain but then withdrew the agreement; held the
confession was involuntary); State v. Hooper, 534 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1976): 3 WIG.MORL
supra note 8, at § 834. See also United States % Dalrymple. 14 U S C M -N 30", 34
C.M.R. 87 (1963) (promise of immunity).
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such a promise to result in suppression it should be possible of
fulfillment and thus its maker must have some influence. 84 An
accused who initiates a bargaining session with authorities by
offering a statement in return for some concession will not
normally be heard to complain that his statement was involun-
tary.85
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL COERCION
It is well recognized that coercion need not be physical to be
effective.86 Indeed, most successful interrogation techniques
are almost purely psychological, 87 a fact which proved a major
cause for the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona.
Whether holding a suspect incommunicado, helping him to ex-
cuse the offense, supplying sympathy, or using a "Mutt and
Jeff' routine,88 use of psychological techniques by interroga-
tors may have a coercive effect. The courts have recognized
that such coercion may render a confession involuntary just as
physical coercion may. However, in this area determination of
what actually did take place and what its effect should be is
particularly difficult and a final judgment is likely to depend
upon the character and background of the suspect.8 9 In State
v. Edwards,90 the Arizona Supreme Court found that the police
actions of using sympathy, stressing "sisterhood" between the
female suspect and a female officer, and minimizing the moral
seriousness of the charge, were in conjunction with other vio-
84 3 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at §§ 827-830. The rule suggested is to examine each
case individually to determine the relationship between the suspect and the promisor.
See also State v. Hess, 9 Ariz. App. 29, 449 P.2d 46 (1969) (promise not to file a com-
plaint held an improper inducement).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Faulk, 48 C.M.R. 185 (ACMR 1973).
86 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); United States v. Josey,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 767, 14 C.M.R. 185 (1954); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT
PROCEDURE§ 140.4 (1975).
87 See, e.g., F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS
(2d ed. 1967); Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on
Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728
(1963).
88 An interrogation routine usually utilizing two interrogators, one of whom is
hostile and aggressive and the other sympathetic and somewhat passive. The intent
is to build a sympathetic relationship between the suspect and the second interrogator.
The same routine can be used with only one interrogator who will simply change his
approach as necessary. The Court of Military Appeals found a statement extracted
through the use of such a technique admissible in United States v. Howard, 11
U.S.C.M.A. 252,256-57,39 C.M.R. 252,256-57 (1969).
89 See Section VI infra.
90 111 Ariz. 357,529 P.2d 1174 (1974).
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lations9' more than enough to result in an overborne will ren-
dering the resulting confession involuntary. Similarly in State
v. Pruitt,92 the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the
interrogation of Pruitt by three police officers took place in a
police-dominated atmosphere characterized by repeated com-
ments that the suspect's story had too many holes, that he was
lying, and that they did not want to fool around. The court
found that the fear, augmented by a threat that things would
be rougher if he did not cooperate, necessitated exclusion of the
resulting statement. The decision of a court will of course de-
pend on the specific facts of each case. In State v. Iverson,93
the Supreme Court of North Dakota sustained the admissibility
of a statement given after an interrogation session attended by
a bloodhound and which included a suggestion that Iverson
take a lie detector test. Testing the circumstances of the inter-
rogation, the past experience of the suspect with the law, and
the suspect's rational participation in the session, the court
found that the statements were voluntary.
D. DECEIT
The police have frequently used deceit to obtain confessions.
Examples include misrepresenting that an accomplice has con-
fessed,94 misrepresenting the seriousness of the offense or con-
dition of the victim,95 misrepresenting that evidence has been
found,96 and disguising police officers. 97 While numerous
courts and commentators have joined in condemning deceit, 98
91 Other factors included continuous interrogation, a request that the suspect take
a polygraph (and stating that a refusal indicated guilt) and most important, due to
Miranda, ignoring the suspect's request for counsel. The last factor alone would have
required suppression.
92 286 N.C. 442,212 S.E.2d 92 (1975).
93 225 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 1974).
94See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); People v. Houston, 36
Ill. App. 3d 695, 344 N.E.2d 641 (1976); Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423. 322 A.2d
119(1974).
95See, e.g., In re Walker, 10 Cal. 3d 764, 518 P.2d 1129, 112 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1974);
State v. Cooper, 217N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1974).
96 Cf. State v. Oakes, 19 Ore. 284, 527 P.2d 418 (1974) (defendant told that guns
found in his possession were on the"hot sheet").
97 See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (police officer disguised
as a cellmate); United States v. Hinkson, 17 U.S.C.M.A., 37 C.M.R. 390 (1967) (under-
cover agent attired as prisoner); cf. State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358,. 543 P.2d
952,957-58(1975).
98See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) ("any evidence that
the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that
the defendant did not voluntarily waive his pnvilege"); Hileman v. State. 258 Ark. - ,




most courts continue to sustain the admissibility of confessions
obtained through its use. So long as the deceit does not nullify
the Miranda warnings, 99 overcome another policy such as the
right to counsel, °° overbear the will of a person, or make it
likely that a false statement might result,' 0' a resulting state-
ment is usually deemed voluntary and admissible.
E. THE POLYGRAPH
While the results of polygraph or lie detector examinations
are not yet generally admissible in evidence, the polygraph
itself plays a major role in law enforcement. Invited to clear
themselves via the machine, numerous suspects submit to a
polygraph examination only to be trapped by their own fears
of the machines, occasionally augmented by police com-
mentary. 02 Both the pretest and the examination itself tend to
create fear and apprehension that result in the suspect confess-
ing and throwing himself on the interrogator's mercy. 10 3 The
test itself is voluntary and cannot be compelled. Article 31
rights are required and if a custodial situation exists, Miranda
rights warnings are required; yet confessions continue. While at
least one court has stated that "the situation a lie detector test
presents can best be described as a psychological rubber
hose," "04 courts across the country have ruled that the mere use
of a polygraph will not render a confession involuntary.' °0
"The decision to speak must be voluntary; once made, deception appears ac-
ceptable. There are a number of cases holding that subterfuge does not necessarily
preclude a knowing waiver of rights, See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 217 N.W.2d 589
(Iowa 1974); Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423, 322 A.2d 119 (1974) (being de-
ceived that co-defendant had implicated him did not preclude a knowing waiver).
10°See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). But see Milton v.
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
01 See, e.g., United States v. McKay, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 527, 561, 26 C.M.R. 307, 311
(1958); In re Walker, 10 Cal. 3d 764, 777, 518 P.2d 1129, 1136-37, 112 Cal. Rptr. 177,
184-85 (1974). The due process test remains paramount. However, reliability is fre-
quently discussed in deceit cases and occasionally appears to be the primary test.
102See e.g., United States v. Handsome, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 330, 45 C.M.R. 1041
(1972); Johnson v. State, 19 Crim. L. Rep. 2159 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. April 15, 1976).
103 See United States v. Bostic, 35 C.M.R. 511, 523-24 (ABR), petition for recon-
sideration denied, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 35 C.M.R. 381 (1965); United States v. Lane,
34 C.M.R. 744,756 (CGCMR 1964).
,04 State v. Faller, _ S.D.-., 227 N.W.2d 433,435(1976).
01 See, e.g., Sotelo v. State, - Ind.-., 342 N.E.2d 844 (1976); State v. Bow-
den, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975); People v. Wilson, 78 Misc. 2d 468, 478-79, 354




What will create an involuntary statement, however, will be
coercion to take the test, 06 or police misconduct.107
VI. THE NATURE OF THE SUSPECT
Under the federal due process test, a confession will be in-
voluntary if the person being questioned was denied the ability
to make a free choice-in short, if his will was overborne. A
court dealing with a challenged confession must not only ex-
plore the nature of the alleged coercion or inducement, but if
the case does not involve inherent coercion must weigh the
character and background of the person interrogated. The to-
tality of the circumstances thus includes the suspect. As a gen-
eral rule it can be stated that questions of age, intelligence,
and mental or physical condition are simply factors that must
be considered in determining voluntariness.
The fact that a minor is involved in a confession will not as
such make a confession inadmissible.'0 8 Age and understand-
ing will, however, be substantial factors to be considered by
judge and jury. 109
10 See, e.g., State v. Cullison. 215 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1974) (woman told that she
should either submit to a medical examination or to a polygraph examination or the
police would "leave no stone unturned- in their in~estigation). Tests in the mtltary
are voluntary and the suspect must be fully warned of his rights. Army Reg. No
195-6, Department of the Army Polygraph Activities. para. I-Sd (26 May 1976)
I0' Interestingly enough the courts, despite hostility to polygraphs. have not used
accusations of lying or coaxing by police to invalidate confessions, but rather have
tried to determine whether the suspect's will had been oserborne. See. eg.. State v
Bowden, 342 A.2d 281,285 (Me. 1975).
108See, e.g., In re M.D.J.,.- D.C. App.-. 346 A.2d 733 (1975). In re Mellott.
27 N.C. 81, 217 S.E.2d 745 (1975): Commonwealth %. Wilson. 458 Pa. 285. 329 A.2d
881(1974).
109 Age can be a determining factor. See. e.g.. United States v. Knooihuizen. 16
C.M.R. 573 (AFBR 1954) (statement of 19-year-old airman made in reliance on inter-
rogator's promise not to prosecute held inadmissible): Commonwealth v. Eden, 456
Pa. 1, 317 A.2d 255 (1974) (14-year-old who had been sniffing glue with drug expert-
ence found to lack sufficient understanding of iranda warnings for his confession
to be voluntary). Some states have chosen to treat juvenile confessions in a different
manner than adult statements. Thus in some states a minor may not make a statement
unless he has consulted with a parent. See. e.g.. Weatherspoon v. State. 328 So. 2d
875, 876 (Fla. App. 1976) ("juveniles are afforded rights and considerations not
available to adult offenders"); Crook v. State, 546 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1976) (statutory
requirement that questioning be in the presence of guardian or legal custodian);
Commonwealth v. Stanton, - Pa. -, 351 A.2d 663 (1976). In others, a minor must
be released to his parents or taken immediately to a juvenile court or detention home.
Failure to do so will render the statement inadmissible. See. e.g.. State _ Wade. 530
S.W.2d 736 (Mo.), as modified._ S.W.2d -(1976); State v. Strickland. 532 S.W_2d
912 (Tenn. 1975). At least one case has found the statement to be inadmissible %%hen it
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The mentally retarded are in the same legal position as any
other group of people. If a retarded individual is an adult, or
a minor in a state without a special provision, the retardation
will be considered as simply another factor going into the vol-
untariness equation." 0 Similarly, the mentally ill are considered
able to make a knowing, intelligent decision to confess in the
absence of a specific condition that would interfere with their
ability to cope with reality to a significant extent.' I'
Physical illness as such is treated as any other factor and each
case will be determined by its specific facts.1 2 Difficulties
exist in the areas of intoxication and drug abuse. The traditional
rule for intoxication is that "proof of [voluntary] intoxication
amounting to mania or such an impairment of the will and mind
as to make the person confessing unconscious of the meaning
of his words renders a confession so made by him inadmissible,
but a lesser state of intoxication will not render the confession
inadmissible." 113 Drug addiction per se does not make a con-
fession involuntary."t4  However, withdrawal symptoms or
threats or promises connected with withdrawal may make a
statement inadmissible."15 There appears to be a strong trend
in the alcohol and drug cases towards emphasizing the relia-
bility of the statement, perhaps to a greater extent than free
choice. The law has never favored intoxication and it would
was made at the urging of the minor's mother who had not been informed of the child's
right to remain silent. Commonwealth v. Starkes, - Pa. -. 335 A.2d 698(1975).
HOSee, e.g., State v. Pyle, 216 Kan. 423, 532 P.2d 1309 (1975); Commonwealth
v. Tucker, 461 Pa. 191, 335 A.2d 704 (1975) (19-year-old with second grade education,
IQ of 75-79 and constitutional psychopath); State v. Ross, 320 So. 2d 177 (La. 1975)
(low mentality and illiteracy); People v. Langston, 57 Mich. App. 666, 226 N.W.2d
686 (1975) (defendant mentally deficient and did not understand the situation; held
his confession was involuntary).
'See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, 51 C.M.R. 541 (ACMR 1975); Schade v.
State, 512 P.2d 907, 916 (Alas. 1973); People v. Brown, 18 Crim. L. Rep. 2514 (Nassau
County Ct. N.Y., Feb. 9, 1976) (internal pressures did not make confession involun-
tary).
i12 See. e.g., Barnett v. State, 286 So. 2d 876 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied. 51
Ala. 484,286 So. 2d 890 (1973).
113 Patterson v. State, 56 Ala. 359, 321 So. 2d 698 (1975), citing Carter v. State,
297 So. 2d 175 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975). See also United States v. Sikorski, 21
U.S.C.M.A. 345, 45 C.M.R. 119, 125-26 (1972); State v. Arredondo, I11 Ariz. 141,
526 P.2d 163 (1974); People v. Durante, 48 App. Div. 2d 962, 369 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561
(1975); State v. Saxon, 261 S.C. 523, 201 S.E.2d 114 (1973). But see State v. Lloyd,
538 P.2d 1278 (1975) (defendant in jail for detoxification could not understand Miranda
warnings; statement suppressed).
114 See, e.g., Hayward v. Johnson, 508 F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Arcediano, 371 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); People v. Delgado, 30 II. App. 3d 890,
892-93, 333 N.E.2d 633, 635-36 (1975); Fred v. State, 531 P.2d 1038 (Okla. 1975).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Monroe, 397 F. Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1975).
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appear that in this area as well, an intoxicated individual is
considered to have waived his right to make a truly free and
intelligent choice. However, if the alcohol or drug has rendered
an individual peculiarly susceptible to some form of pressure,
that factor will be taken into account.
VII. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
An involuntary confession is normally inadmissible in evi-
dence. Further, in most cases any evidence gained through the
involuntary statement will also be inadmissible. 116 The exclu-
sion of derivative evidence under the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine is necessitated by the desire to prevent improper
police conduct as well as by doubt as to the propriety of courts'
using illegally obtained evidence. While exclusion of coerced or
induced statements may also be justified on the ground that
the evidence itself is unreliable, the same conclusion does not
necessarily flow from possible use of derivative evidence." 7
Accordingly, the ban on derivative evidence must be presumed
to stem from policy considerations rather than reliability
grounds. While an involuntary statement will not automatically
prevent a subsequent, voluntary interrogation from producing
admissible evidence, the Court of Military Appeals has sug-
116 See generally 3 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 859. Interestingly, MCM, 1969,
para. 15Ob attempts to limit exclusion of derivative evidence to cases where "compul-
sion was applied by, or at the instigation or with the participation of, an official or
agent of the United States, or any State thereof or political subdivision of either who
was acting in a governmental capacity." While this rule has been ascribed to Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 1 (1964), DA PAi 27-2, supra note 5. at 27-36, it is
more likely that it is the product of United States v. Trojanowski, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 305,
17 C.M.R. 305 (1954). The interpretation is questionable. In Trojanowski. the Court
of Military Appeals felt that little purpose would be served by extending the Article
31(d) exclusionary rule to service personnel acting as private citizens. In reaching this
conclusion the court ignored the possibility that Congress had intended to extend
individual rights beyond the minimal constitutional level by the enactment of Article
31 of the Uniform Code. More importantly, the legislative history suggests that Con-
gress interpreted the phrasing of the military exclusionary rule, Article 31(d). to in-
clude derivative evidence. In the Hearings on the Uniform Code conducted on Article
31, Mr. Smart, a committee staff member, explained: "Subdivision (d) [of Article 31]
makes statements or evidence obtained in violation of the first three subdivisions
inadmissible. . . ." Hearings on H. R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Armed Services, 81 st Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1949) (emphasis added).
117 Derivative evidence (which could include proceeds of crime, weapons or equip-
ment used to accomplish the crime, other witness, etc.) should usually be perfectly
reliable and not susceptible to the doubts that accompany possibly inaccurate or false
statements. Note that the key theoretical difference between the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule and the fifth amendment rule is that questions of reliability are
completely absent from questions of illegal search and seizure which generally supply
"hard" evidence such as crime proceeds.
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gested that it will be difficult to overcome the taint resulting
from the first involuntary statement. 18
VIII. THE VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE AT TRIAL
A. STANDING
Because an involuntary statement must usually be excluded
from evidence, the rule has evolved that before a party may
challenge the admissibility of a statement on voluntariness
grounds, he must have an adequate personal interest in its
suppression. This requirement, known as standing, has been
held to mean that a defendant can only object to a statement
made by himself. Thus the general rule is that an accused is
unable to challenge a statement made by or evidence derived
from another person although offered to prove the guilt of the
accused. 19 This can be particularly important in cases involving
accomplices. Presumably this limitation is designed to balance
the rights of the individual on trial against the societal interest
in allowing as much probative evidence to be brought before
the jury as possible. 20 One possible exception to the rule may
exist, however. In LaFrance v. Bohlinger,12' the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that where
the prosecution had attempted to impeach its own witness with
an allegedly coerced confession, the trial court should have
determined the voluntariness of the confession even though it
had not been made by the defendant. The court's reasoning
was primarily that "[t]he due process requirements of a fair
trial clearly extend to matters dealing with a witness' credi-
bility." 122 While the court limited its expansion of the tradi-
tional standing rule, the case does suggest that due process
considerations may allow an accused to occasionally challenge
statements made by other parties.
18 United States v. Seay, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 7, 10,51 C.M.R. 57,60(1975).
119 Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (fourth amendment
electronic eavesdropping case).
12 Standing to challenge illegal searches and seizures appears to be broader,
perhaps because the right involved is primarily one of privacy.
121 499 F.2d 29 (Ist Cir. 1974).
122 Id. at 34. In LaFrance, a Massachusetts habeas corpus case, the statement
involved was alleged to be a police fabrication signed by an accomplice in jail while
he was "strung out on drugs." It is questionable whether the court's decision would
have been the same if a case of unlawful inducement had been claimed. Interestingly,
the circuit court determined that despite the state rule requiring jury determination
in the event of a ruling adverse to the defense by the trial judge on the voluntariness




The .general rule throughout the United States is that the
prosecution must prove a confession or admission to have been
voluntarily made before it can be received into evidence. 23
While the burden of proof is on the government, what has
occasionally been called the burden of going forward is unclear.
It appears that in many American jurisdictions, the defense
must raise the issue of voluntariness or risk waiving the
issue. 124 Once the defense has properly raised an objection, the
government will be put to its burden. The degree to which the
defense must object is unclear. As a matter of practice, it seems
likely that many if not most jurisdictions shift the burden im-
mediately upon defense objection or upon a recital of the nature
of the alleged coercion or inducement. In other jurisdictions,
the defense appears to have to present some evidence on the
question before the prosecution must prove voluntariness. 25
Some states assume that confessions are prima facie involun-
tary until proven otherwise; 126 in such a jurisdiction the prose-
cution will have to prove voluntariness even in the absence of
defense objection. The Manual for Courts-Martial requires the
prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a statement unless the
'
23 See generally Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); MCM, 1969, par.
140a(2); 3 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 860. Some states had rules which held that
confessions were prima facie admissible and placed the burden on the defense to show
them to be involuntary. See 3 WIGMORE, supra, at § 860 n.5. However, these rules
seem invalidated by the Supreme Court's decision in Lego v. Twomey. 404 U.S. 477,
489 (1972), holding "the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the
evidence that the confession was voluntary." However, see note 126 infra. The prose-
cution additionally has the burden of showing that the proper Article 31-Miranda-
Tempia rights warnings were given.
124 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12; United States v. Carter, 431 F.2d 1093. 1096-97
(8th Cir. 1970); Jacobsen v. California, 431 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1970) (in both
cases the judge instructed the jury on voluntariness but failed to consider the issue
himself). See also United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129(10th Cir. 1975):
Logic dictates that a pretrial motion to suppress filed by an accused does tn Lct cat the bwdz-n upots
the ooant to present facts necssary to sustain his position. While the defendant mitm firt pr xe-,
evidence tn support of his motion to suppress which satisfies his burden of chal ,ngS thet trty of
the confession. v e have recognized that the Government mitr then cart the countervadilg brden
of provinga Aaiver of theconsutuuonal pnilege against sei-ntcimanuon
Id. at 1135. Cf United States v. Yamashita, 527 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1975); People v.
Hawkins, 58 Mich. App. 69, 226 N.W.2d 851 (1975); State v. Blanchard, 527 S.W.2d
37 (Mo. App. 1975); State v. Helker, 88 N.M. 650, 545 P.2d 1028 (1975). But see Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1976) (construing the Florida rule as rejecting
waiver for failure to object).
125 Cf United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129. 1135 (10th Cir. 1975). See note
124 supra. The degree of objection or evidence required of the defense vanes by juras-
diction; the degree to which the defense may be required to present evidence is unclear.
26 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 292 Ala. 126,290 So. 2d 165 (1974).
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defense expressly waives the issue. 27 This would appear to
place the burden of going forward in courts-martial on the
prosecution rather than on the defense. Consequently a defense
failure to raise the issue should certainly not result in waiver128
unless the defense subsequently adopts the statement and ar-
gues it to the court. The contemporary practice has the defense
counsel raising the voluntariness issue, usually by motion, in a
procedure closely akin to that used in civilian courts. This op-
tional technique is to be encouraged as it precludes a possible
error by the prosecution which could require a mistrial. From
the defense standpoint, it also has the advantage of attempting
to raise the issue at a more advantageous time than the prose-
cution might choose. However, the procedure is not a required
one under the Manual.
The nature of the prosecution's burden of proof has been
settled only recently. In Lego v. Twomey,1 29 the Supreme
Court held that the government must prove voluntariness using
a preponderance of the evidence standard.130 While this speci-
fies the minimum constitutional rule, a number of jurisdictions
are requiring the government to prove voluntariness beyond a
reasonable doubt.'3' The military uses a combined preponder-
ance and reasonable doubt test. 32
Some states have also required that in certain cases, usually
those raising the issue of physical coercion or improper induce-
ment, the prosecution must call all material witnesses rather
than picking those it prefers to testify. 33
127 MCM, 1969, para. 140a.
12s United States v. Graves, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 434, 50 C.M.R. 393 (1975) (failure
of defense counsel to raise voluntariness issue did not result in waiver; trial judge should
have instructed sua sponte).
12 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
130 Id. at 489.
"I See, e.g., Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters,
315 So. 2d 678, 682 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975); State
v. Washington, 135 N.J. Super. 23,342 A.2d 559 (1975).
"I Military courts-martial use a two-part test. The trial judge determines if the
confession is voluntary using a preponderance standard, cf. United States v. Mewborn,
17 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 38 C.M.R. 229 (1964), and then, on defense request, will instruct
the court members that they must be able to find the confession voluntary beyond a
reasonable doubt before they can consider it. MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2). Unlike the
defense, the prosecution does not get a second chance if the judge holds against it
using the preponderance standard.
33 See, e.g., Russey v. State, 257 Ark. 570, 519 S.W.2d 751 (1975); Evans v.
State, 285 So. 2d 786 (Miss. 1973); cf. In re Lamb, 61 111. 2d 383, 336 N.E.2d 753 (1975).




There are two basic, constitutionally permissible procedures
to determine the voluntariness of statements-the "orthodox"
rule and the "Massachusetts" rule. 34 Under the orthodox rule,
the trial judge determines the voluntariness of the statement
out of the presence of the jury and his determination is conclu-
sive.135 Under the Massachusetts rule, in use in the mili-
tary, 136 the trial judge makes a first determination out of the
jury's presence 37 and then if the finding is against the defend-
ant will instruct the jury that before it can consider the state-
ment in evidence it must first determine the voluntariness of the
confession or admission. 138 Thus under the Massachusetts rule,
the accused receives two determinations. Under federal stat-
ute 39 it appears that all civilian federal courts are required to
apply the Massachusetts rule. 40 While the orthodox rule is
simpler and more efficient, at least one court has found it "con-
tains aspects of harshness inconsistent %ith the general admin-
istration of criminal law . . . [attaching] to the preliminary
determination of the court an aura of infallibility which . . . is
not consistent with the general concepts of the right to jury
trial." '4' Instructions to the jury in jurisdictions following the
Massachusetts rule should not inform the jury that the judge
has already determined the statement to be voluntary for such
an instruction may prejudice thejury.142
Traditionally the military procedure to determine voluntari-
ness was to litigate the issue when the challenged statement was
offered into evidence. This is still possible, although the more
usual procedure is for the defense 43 to raise the issue in an
134 See generally Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Jackson the Court
invalidated the "New York" rule under which the trial judge made a preliminary deter-
mination of voluntariness but which required him to submit the issue to the jury unless
"in no circumstances could the confession be deemed voluntary." 378 U.S. at 377. See
generally 3 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 861.
135 See, e.g., State v. Langley, 25 N.C. App. 298.212 S.E.2d 687(1975).
136 MCM, 1969, paras. 53d(l) & 140a(2).
137 See FED. R. EviD. 104(c): "Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall
in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury."
13S See, e.g., Ross v. State. 504 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Har-
baugh, 132 Vt. 569,578,326 A.2d 821,827 (1974).
139 18 U.S.C. §350 l(a) (1970).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 518 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1975).
141 State v. Harbaugh. 132 Vt. 569,579,326 A.2d 821,827(1974).
'42See, e.g., United States v. Bear Killer, No. 75-1814 (8th Cir.. April 16, 1976);
Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 147, 355 A.2d 455. 463 (1976); People v. Cwikla, 45
App. Div. 2d 504,360 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1974).
143 As the Manual for Courts-Martial indicates that the burden, in the absence
of an express waiver, is on the prosecution to show the voluntariness of a statement,
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Article 39(a) session before the trial judge and out of the pres-
ence of the court members. Inasmuch as the military lacks a
formal suppression motion, 44 the issue is usually raised before
plea by a motion for appropriate relief in the nature of a motion
to suppress. The trial judge may, in his discretion, hear the
motion or may treat the matter as an objection to the evidence
sometime after plea. As the judge will make his determination
out of the presence of the court members in any event, the only
issue here is one of timing. Postponement may be desired by
the prosecution for if the accused should plead guilty, perhaps
under the influence of a plea bargain, all confession and search
and seizure issues will be waived. 145 While this clearly saves a
great amount of judicial time and effort, it does frequently
force an accused to choose between a good pretrial agreement
and a possible challenge to a confession. It can be suggested
that the choice is not one of those which the law should pro-
hibit. While the voluntariness doctrine does concern itself with
police misconduct (to a much greater extent than reliability),
alternate forms of attacking improper military procedures to
obtain confessions exist 146 and the reliability consideration
should not be relevant to guilty plea cases. The balance be-
tween the possible "chilling effect" and procedural efficiency
has not yet been determined by the Court of Military Appeals.
D. PROOF
Once the issue has been raised, 47 the prosecution has the
burden of proving the voluntariness of the statements of the
accused which have been offered into evidence. Normally this
compels the government to call at least one witness to the actual
taking of the confession who will testify to the surrounding
circumstances and will attempt to show a completely voluntary
act on the part of the accused. Because of the Article 31-
Miranda rights warnings, usually this proof will follow, some-
MCM, 1969, para. 140a, the prosecution should raise this issue. However, it is more
likely that the defense will be the first to do so in practice.
144 Cf. United States v. Mirabel, 48 C.M.R. 803 (ACMR 1974).
145 This is true even if the issue has been litigated before plea. United States v.
Dusenberry, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 287,49 C. M.R. 536 (1975).
146 Under military law, coercion of a confession is a criminal offense. UCMJ art.
98. While no such prosecution is recorded in the reported cases, the remedy exists
and perhaps needs only additional publicity, although the probability of prosecution
of military police may be deemed minimal. See generally Lederer, Rights Warnings
in the Armed Services, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8-9(1976).
14 In the military an accused may take the stand for the limited purpose of denying
that any statement was made at all, MCM, 1969, para. 140a(3), or for the limited
purpose of contesting the voluntariness of a statement. MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2).
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times in an almost incidental fashion, the showing that those
requirements were properly complied with. The defense will of
course attempt to show a different picture of the interrogation.
To minimize questions of proof, increased interest is being
shown in recording police interrogations via either tape record-
ing, movie or videotape. While videotape use will not resolve all
questions and will require proper authentication procedures, it
appears most likely to moot the usual battle as to what actually
did take place at the interrogation.
E. THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
The same reluctance to convict defendants on the basis of
confession evidence which helped give rise to the voluntariness
doctrine gave rise to the corroboration requirement. Originally
dealing primarily with crimes of violence, the rule requires that
before a confession or an admission 48 may result in a convic-
tion the statement must be corroborated by independent evi-
dence. 49 Thus the courts have imposed an additional reliability
check on confession evidence. Two primary corroboration rules
exist in the United States. Under the majority rule, independent
evidence must substantiate the corpus delicti, or in other words
show that a criminal act has in fact occurred. 50 Independent
evidence is not needed to show the identity of the perpetra-
tor.151 Under the minority rule, used by the civilian federal
courts 52 and the military, 5 3 independent evidence must be
received to show that the confession is trustworthy. As
McCormick suggests, 5 4 the civilian federal courts have tended
148 There is no difference in treatment between confessions and admissions in the
federal courts, Opper v. United States. 348 U.S. 84. 90-92 (1954). although some juns-
dictions may apply the rule only to confessions.
149 See generally C. MCCORMIcK. EVIDENCE § 158 (2d ed 1972). 8 J Wi'4OEt.
EVIDENCE§§ 2070-2075 (3d ed. 1940).
IS See, e.g., Tanner v. State, 57 Ala. App. 254, 327 So. 2d 749 (1976) (Itestimon%
showing that 988 tires were missing from inventory with value of S33.000 corroborated
the confession of the defendant); People v. Ruckdeschel. 51 App. Di% 2d 861. 862.
380 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (1976) (failure of independent evidence to sho, a larcenous
taking from the victim resulted in insufficient corroboration and compelled resersal
of conviction for first degree robbery); Davis v. State. 542 P2d 532 (Okla, 1975) (in-
dependent evidence established that a dead body was found and the death vas shown
to have occurred as a result of multiple stab wounds, corroborating the confession).
1 See, e.g.. People v. Reeves, 39 Cal. App. 3d 944, 946-47, 114 Cal. Rptr 574.
575-76(1974). Usually this is the element of proof supplied by the confession.
152 See, e.g., Smith v. United States. 348 U.S. 147 (1954). Opper United States.
348 U.S. 84(1954); United States v. Wilson. 529 F.2d 913,915 ( 10th Cir. 1976).
iS3MCM, 1969, para. 140a(5); United States v. Crider. 45 C.M R. 815 (NCMR
1972).
5 4 C. MCCORNICK. EVIDENCE§ 159 (2d ed. 1972).
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to confuse the standards and frequently require that the corpus
delicti be shown. 155 Because that standard almost always also
establishes the trustworthiness of the confession, the difference
between the two standards tends to be purely academic. Cor-
roboration need not be shown beyond a reasonable doubt 56
and may in some jurisdictions, including the military, allow
admission of evidence not normally admissible. 157 The pres-
ence of sufficient evidence to corroborate a confession is a
question for the trial judge in some jurisdictions, 158 and for the
jury in others. 59 The minimum constitutional requirement
thus remains unsettled although in the light of Jackson v.
Denno,160 presumably a judicial determination is adequate.
Traditionally the corroboration requirement has applied only
to extrajudicial confessions and accordingly the rule will not
apply to confessions made during trial by court-martial.'61
F. THE BRUTON RULE
The Bruton rule is the outgrowth of joint trials of co-accused
individuals in which one accused has made a confession that
implicates another. In Bruton v. United States,162 the Supreme
Court held that the admission into evidence of a confession by
one defendant that implicates a co-defendant deprives the
second accused of his sixth amendment right to confrontation
unless the first accused takes the stand and can be cross-exam-
ined about the incriminating statement. The two usual cures
for the Bruton problem are severing the cases of the co-defen-
'55See, e.g., United States v. Danilds, 528 F.2d 705, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 1974).
156 See, e.g., Green v. State,-Ind. App. -,304 N.E.2d 845 (1973).
157 See, e.g., United States v. Stricklin, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 44 C.M.R. 39 (1971)
(hearsay evidence).
'"See, e.g., Felton v. United States, 344 F.2d I 1 (10th Cir. 1965); State v. Kelley,
308 A.2d 877, 885(Me. 1973).
159See. e.g., Burkhalter v. State, 302 So. 2d 503 (Miss. 1974). The Court of
Military Appeals has been unable to resolve this problem definitively and has held in
United States v. Seigle, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 403, 47 C.M.R. 340 (1973), that the issue is
for the trial judge alone unless the evidence is "substantially conflicting, self-contra-
dictory, uncertain, or improbable," in which case the court must, on defense request,
instruct the court members on the issue.
1- 378 U.S. 368(1964).
161 MCM, 1969, para. 140a(5). See also Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d 945,
950 (10th Cir. 1954). According to the Manual, the corroboration requirement also
"does not apply to statements made prior to or contemporaneously with the act" or to
statements admissible under another hearsay exception. MCM, 1969, para. 140a(5).
162 391 U.S. 123 (1968), overruling Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232
(1957) (which had sustained the propriety of a limiting instruction in such cases).
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dants or redacting 63 the confession. The Bruton problem does
not arise in a court-martial by judge alone, 64 when the maker
of the confession takes the stand or if the co-defendant has also
made a similar confession.' 65 The courts have retreated from
the original decision in Bruton and its long term vitality is open
to question. A number of cases 66 have found Bruton errors to
have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus not
reversible error.
IX. THE AUTOMATIC REVERSAL RULE
While every effort is made by the trial judiciary to prevent
error from occurring at trial, error of various types is frequent,
especially in the admission of evidence. While most error will
be scrutinized for the likelihood of prejudice to the accused,
the Supreme Court has promulgated a general harmless error
rule dealing with violations of federal constitutional rights. In
Chapman v. California,167 the Court indicated that a violation
of such a constitutional right must result in reversal of the con-
viction involved unless the error could be shown to have been
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Most interestingly, how-
ever, the Court stated in addition that its "prior cases have
indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a
fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless
error." 168 This phrase is the source of what has been termed
the "automatic reversal rule." Under the rule, error involving
such a basic right cannot be tested for prejudice and the con-
viction must be reversed regardless of the amount of untainted
evidence properly admitted against the accused. Because the
Supreme Court cited a coerced confession case 169 as an exam-
ple of a basic constitutional right, a number of jurisdictions' 70
163 Redaction is the deletion of all references to the co-accused. See. e.g., MCM,
1969, para. 140b. Because this may be practically impossible in many cases it ts a limited
solution. For a general discussion of this issue in the military context, see Corrigan,
Prejudicial Joinder-The Crazy-Quilt World of Severances. 68 MIL. L. Rhv. 1 (1975).
,64 United States v. Aponte, 45 C.M.R. 522(ACMR 1972).
165 See United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker. 514 F.2d 45, 4-49 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1976).
166 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Schneble v. Florida,
405 U.S. 427(1972).
167 386 U.S. 18(1967).
1
6
s Id. at 23.
16 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). Payne, a 19-year-old black. wa.-
charged with the murder of his white employer. Held incommunicado for three days,
denied food for long periods, he was threatened with mob violence if he failed ic
confess. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction.
70 See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 39 C.M.R. 216 (1969)
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have adopted a rule under which any case involving an im-
properly admitted confession' 7' will be reversed automatically.
Unfortunately the true meaning of the Chapman case is un-
clear.
The Court's reference to Payne v. Arkansas in Chapman can
be read as creating an automatic reversal rule applicable to
coerced confessions. However, even if one accepts that con-
clusion, it is unclear whether the rule should extend to other
forms of involuntary confessions 72 (such as those obtained
through improper inducements) or to confessions obtained
through violations of the warning requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona.t73  While the practical difference between the
Chapman harmless error rule and the automatic reversal rule is
extremely small in any event, future civilian clarification of
this perplexing issue 174 can be anticipated.
The Court of Military Appeals, using Chapman as its basis,
applies an automatic reversal rule to courts-martial in which
a confession or admission has erroneously been admitted.7 5
While the court's original reasoning may have been faulty,
recent cases 76 suggest a nonconstitutional basis for the rule
that is highly persuasive. The court has stated 77 that Rvhile it
McKinley v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 26, 154 N.W.2d 344 (1967). See generally 3 WiRtmE,
supra note 8, at § 863 n. 1.
1' California has distinguished between confessions which will invoke the auto-
matic reversal rule and admissions which will not. People v. Stout, 66 Cal. 2d 184, 57
Cal. Rptr. 152, 424 P.2d 704 (1967).
172 The Supreme Court failed to apply the automatic reversal rule to a violation
of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) in Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S.
371 (1972) (admissions made by defendant to a police officer posing as a cellmate
found to constitute harmless error when improperly admitted at trial) and to violations
of the sixth amendment Bruton rule. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Harring-
ton v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). It may well be that an automatic reversal rule
is not constitutionally required for any case.
173 The majority rule appears to be that the automatic reversal rule does not apply
to violations of the Miranda warnings requirements (although the usual Chapman
harmless error rule does). See, e.g., Smith v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1975);
Null v. Wainwright, 508 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1975); State v. Hudson, 325 A.2d 56
(Me. 1974); State v. Persuitti, 133 Vt. 354, 339 A.2d 750 (1975).
14 See generally R. TRAYNOR, TrE RIDDLE OF HARMLEss ERROR (1970); Mause,
Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN.
L. REv. 519 (1969); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973);
Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REv. 814 (1970);
Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967).
'75See, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 104, 41 C.M.R. 104 (1969).
176 United States v. Ward, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 572, 50 C.M.R. 837 (1975); United
States v. Hall, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 549,50 C.M.R. 720 (1975).




will apply the usual constitutional harmless error rule to con-
stitutional violations, a higher standard must be applied in
cases in which a violation of Article 31 rights has occurred. This
reasoning recognizes the congressional interest in according
service personnel greater procedural protection than that avail-
able to the general population, presumably to offset conditions
peculiar to military life.
X. CONCLUSION
The admissibility into evidence of confessions and admissions
has been of concern to Anglo-American lawyers since at least
the 17th Century and the voluntariness doctrine has been the
major tool through which the law has attempted to regulate the
use of these statements. In recent years, however, there has been
an understandable if misguided tendency to presume that the
comparatively recent Article 31-Miranda rights warnings have
subsumed the voluntariness doctrine. While the importance of
Article 31 cannot be overestimated, it should be apparent that
the American voluntariness doctrine both complements and
expands Article 31. As the military tends to reflect civilian legal
trends, there is every reason to believe that as Miranda is
undercut by the Supreme Court the voluntariness doctrine will
take on added importance. Expanded use of the voluntariness
doctrine will have the effect of increasing the emphasis that
both the defense and prosecution must place on the circum-
stances surrounding the taking of a statement. Whether for
present or future practice, this doctrine merits increased atten-
tion by judge advocates.
1976]
